Abortion and the Right to Life Part II

IE. The Right to have One's Life Saved

There is no such right as there is no corresponding moral

obligation or duty to save a life. This "right" is a

demonstration of the aforementioned muddle between the morally

commendable, desirable and decent ("ought", "should") and the

morally obligatory, the result of other people's rights ("must").

In some countries, the obligation to save life is legally

codified. But while the law of the land may create a LEGAL right

and corresponding LEGAL obligations - it does not always or

necessarily create a moral or an ethical right and corresponding

moral duties and obligations.

IF. The Right to Save One's Own Life

The right to self-defence is a subset of the more general and

all-pervasive right to save one's own life. One has the right to

take certain actions or avoid taking certain actions in order to

save his or her own life.

It is generally accepted that one has the right to kill a

pursuer who knowingly and intentionally intends to take one's

life. It is debatable, though, whether one has the right to kill

an innocent person who unknowingly and unintentionally threatens

to take one's life.

IG. The Right to Terminate One's Life

See "The Murder of Oneself".

IH. The Right to Have One's Life Terminated

The right to euthanasia, to have one's life terminated at will,

is restricted by numerous social, ethical, and legal rules,

principles, and considerations. In a nutshell - in many

countries in the West one is thought to has a right to have

one's life terminated with the help of third parties if one is

going to die shortly anyway and if one is going to be tormented

and humiliated by great and debilitating agony for the rest of

one's remaining life if not helped to die. Of course, for one's

wish to be helped to die to be accommodated, one has to be in

sound mind and to will one's death knowingly, intentionally, and

forcefully.

II. Issues in the Calculus of Rights

IIA. The Hierarchy of Rights

All human cultures have hierarchies of rights. These hierarchies

reflect cultural mores and lores and there cannot, therefore, be

a universal, or eternal hierarchy.

In Western moral systems, the Right to Life supersedes all other

rights (including the right to one's body, to comfort, to the

avoidance of pain, to property, etc.).

Yet, this hierarchical arrangement does not help us to resolve

cases in which there is a clash of EQUAL rights (for instance,

the conflicting rights to life of two people). One way to decide

among equally potent claims is randomly (by flipping a coin, or

casting dice). Alternatively, we could add and subtract rights

in a somewhat macabre arithmetic. If a mother's life is

endangered by the continued existence of a fetus and assuming

both of them have a right to life we can decide to kill the

fetus by adding to the mother's right to life her right to her

own body and thus outweighing the fetus' right to life.

IIB. The Difference between Killing and Letting Die

There is an assumed difference between killing (taking life) and

letting die (not saving a life). This is supported by IE above.

While there is a right not to be killed - there is no right to

have one's own life saved. Thus, while there is an obligation

not to kill - there is no obligation to save a life.

IIC. Killing the Innocent

Often the continued existence of an innocent person (IP)

threatens to take the life of a victim (V). By "innocent" we

mean "not guilty" - not responsible for killing V, not intending

to kill V, and not knowing that V will be killed due to IP's

actions or continued existence.

It is simple to decide to kill IP to save V if IP is going to

die anyway shortly, and the remaining life of V, if saved, will

be much longer than the remaining life of IP, if not killed. All

other variants require a calculus of hierarchically weighted

rights. (See "Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life" by Baruch

A. Brody).

One form of calculus is the utilitarian theory. It calls for the

maximization of utility (life, happiness, pleasure). In other

words, the life, happiness, or pleasure of the many outweigh the

life, happiness, or pleasure of the few. It is morally

permissible to kill IP if the lives of two or more people will

be saved as a result and there is no other way to save their

lives. Despite strong philosophical objections to some of the

premises of utilitarian theory - I agree with its practical

prescriptions.

In this context - the dilemma of killing the innocent - one can

also call upon the right to self defence. Does V have a right to

kill IP regardless of any moral calculus of rights? Probably

not. One is rarely justified in taking another's life to save

one's own. But such behaviour cannot be condemned. Here we have

the flip side of the confusion - understandable and perhaps

inevitable behaviour (self defence) is mistaken for a MORAL

RIGHT. That most V's would kill IP and that we would all

sympathize with V and understand its behaviour does not mean

that V had a RIGHT to kill IP. V may have had a right to kill IP

- but this right is not automatic, nor is it all-encompassing.

III. Abortion and the Social Contract

The issue of abortion is emotionally loaded and this often makes

for poor, not thoroughly thought out arguments. The questions:

"Is abortion immoral" and "Is abortion a murder" are often

confused. The pregnancy (and the resulting fetus) are discussed

in terms normally reserved to natural catastrophes (force

majeure). At times, the embryo is compared to cancer, a thief,

or an invader: after all, they are both growths, clusters of

cells. The difference, of course, is that no one contracts

cancer willingly (except, to some extent, smokers --but, then

they gamble, not contract).

When a woman engages in voluntary sex, does not use

contraceptives and gets pregnant - one can say that she signed a

contract with her fetus. A contract entails the demonstrated

existence of a reasonably (and reasonable) free will. If the

fulfillment of the obligations in a contract between individuals

could be life-threatening - it is fair and safe to assume that

no rational free will was involved. No reasonable person would

sign or enter such a contract with another person (though most

people would sign such contracts with society).

Judith Jarvis Thomson argued convincingly ("A Defence of

Abortion") that pregnancies that are the result of forced sex

(rape being a special case) or which are life threatening should

or could, morally, be terminated. Using the transactional

language: the contract was not entered to willingly or

reasonably and, therefore, is null and void. Any actions which

are intended to terminate it and to annul its consequences

should be legally and morally permissible.

The same goes for a contract which was entered into against the

express will of one of the parties and despite all the

reasonable measures that the unwilling party adopted to prevent

it. If a mother uses contraceptives in a manner intended to

prevent pregnancy, it is as good as saying: " I do not want to

sign this contract, I am doing my reasonable best not to sign

it, if it is signed - it is contrary to my express will". There

is little legal (or moral) doubt that such a contract should be

voided.

Much more serious problems arise when we study the other party

to these implicit agreements: the embryo. To start with, it

lacks consciousness (in the sense that is needed for signing an

enforceable and valid contract). Can a contract be valid even if

one of the "signatories" lacks this sine qua non trait? In the

absence of consciousness, there is little point in talking about

free will (or rights which depend on sentience). So, is the

contract not a contract at all? Does it not reflect the

intentions of the parties?

The answer is in the negative. The contract between a mother and

her fetus is derived from the larger Social Contract. Society -

through its apparatuses - stands for the embryo the same way

that it represents minors, the mentally retarded, and the

insane. Society steps in - and has the recognized right and

moral obligation to do so - whenever the powers of the parties

to a contract (implicit or explicit) are not balanced. It

protects small citizens from big monopolies, the physically weak

from the thug, the tiny opposition from the mighty

administration, the barely surviving radio station from the

claws of the devouring state mechanism. It also has the right

and obligation to intervene, intercede and represent the

unconscious: this is why euthanasia is absolutely forbidden

without the consent of the dying person. There is not much

difference between the embryo and the comatose.

A typical contract states the rights of the parties. It assumes

the existence of parties which are "moral personhoods" or

"morally significant persons" - in other words, persons who are

holders of rights and can demand from us to respect these

rights. Contracts explicitly elaborate some of these rights and

leaves others unmentioned because of the presumed existence of

the Social Contract. The typical contract assumes that there is

a social contract which applies to the parties to the contract

and which is universally known and, therefore, implicitly

incorporated in every contract. Thus, an explicit contract can

deal with the property rights of a certain person, while

neglecting to mention that person's rights to life, to free

speech, to the enjoyment the fruits of his lawful property and,

in general to a happy life.

There is little debate that the Mother is a morally significant

person and that she is a rights-holder. All born humans are and,

more so, all adults above a certain age. But what about the

unborn fetus?

One approach is that the embryo has no rights until certain

conditions are met and only upon their fulfillment is he

transformed into a morally significant person ("moral agent").

Opinions differ as to what are the conditions. Rationality, or a

morally meaningful and valued life are some of the oft cited

criteria. The fallaciousness of this argument is easy to

demonstrate: children are irrational - is this a licence to

commit infanticide?

A second approach says that a person has the right to life

because it desires it.

But then what about chronic depressives who wish to die - do we

have the right to terminate their miserable lives? The good part

of life (and, therefore, the differential and meaningful test)

is in the experience itself - not in the desire to experience.

Another variant says that a person has the right to life because

once his life is terminated - his experiences cease. So, how

should we judge the right to life of someone who constantly

endures bad experiences (and, as a result, harbors a death

wish)? Should he better be "terminated"?

(continued)

About the author:

Sam Vaknin is the author of Malignant Self Love - Narcissism

Revisited and After the Rain - How the West Lost the East. He is

a columnist for Central Europe Review, United Press

International (UPI) and eBookWeb and the editor of mental health

and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory,

Suite101 and searcheurope.com.

Visit Sam's Web site at http://samvak.tripod.com

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Abortion and the Right to Life Part II

Article : Abortion and the Right to Life Part II